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Abstract
We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on
di⁄erent issues of political interest by the media, and we illustrate the
e⁄ects of the media choice of slant on political outcomes and economic
decisions in a rational expectations model. In a two-candidate elec-
tion, if the media is biased in favor of the underdog, then it will put
more emphasis on issues with a large electoral impact, hoping that
the news will deliver an upset victory. Whether citizens are better
o⁄ with media biased in favor of the underdog or the frontrunner de-
pends on the importance of choosing the ￿right￿candidate for citizens
versus the impact of political news on the private economic decisions
of voters. Balanced media, giving each issue equal coverage, may be
worse for voters than partisan media.
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In contemporary democracies, the opinions and electoral decisions of citi-
zens are based to a large extent on the information provided to them by
mass media. Coverage of news events, however, is by necessity selective:
the media must choose which events to cover and how much emphasis to
give to each. Moreover, given the limited disposition of citizens to process
information about complex political issues, news media very often must sim-
plify the analysis of news they do cover. The ideological construct of the
liberal-conservative spectrum, for example, is regularly re￿ ected and rein-
forced in the jargon of political coverage by the news media. In fact, re-
search in political science supports the hypothesis that the meaning of the
liberal-conservative spectrum has changed over time:
The space in which political parties compete can be of highly
variable structure. Just as the parties may be perceived and eval-
uated on several dimensions, so the dimensions that are salient
to the electorate may change widely over time....Drastic elec-
toral changes can result from changes in the coordinate system of
the space rather than changes in the distribution of parties and
voters.￿ (Stokes (1963), pp.371￿ 372, original emphasis)
The role of the media in determining the salience of political issues for
the public, thereby in￿ uencing the political agenda, has long been recognized
and debated by political scientists and sociologists.1 As well, a recent but
growing literature in economics has started to explore the role of the media
in shaping policy outcomes through its in￿ uence on public opinion. Most
of this literature conceives of media in￿ uence as the result of opportunistic,
selective omission of facts toward a particular end.2 We take the view that
media in￿ uence operates through not just the suppression of information, but
more generally in the choice of perspective, involving emphasis and depth of
coverage of the di⁄erent issues, rather than outright denial of inconvenient
1McCombs and Shaw (1972), for example, state that ￿the mass media set the agenda for
each political campaign, in￿ uencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues￿
(p.177). See Schudson and Waisbord (2005) for a recent review.
2With some exceptions; see a short review of the literature in the next section.
1facts.3
In this paper, we consider an election between a known incumbent and
an unknown challenger, who is the subject of news coverage. Our approach
grows out of the citizen-candidate literature (Osborne and Slivinski 1996,
Besley and Coate 1997), where the policy positions of the politicians are
￿xed, but we incorporate the news media as a player that can in￿ uence the
voters￿information about the challenger through its choice of perspective, or
slant. We do not model the media as simply suppressing ex post unpalatable
news. Rather, we assume that the media commits ex ante to a particular
slant, which we de￿ne as a systematic ￿ltering that at once simpli￿es political
reality and assigns relative emphasis to the di⁄erent policy issues. We view
slant as a long-run decision arising from the media outlets￿choice of editorial
board or the hiring and ￿ring of journalists. Since the media choices of
editorial board are public and relatively sticky, we assume that citizens are
fully aware of the media slant when reading the news, updating their beliefs,
and making their decisions. Thus, we provide a rational expectations model
of the impact of slant on elections and policy outcomes.
We posit a simple model of the economy, in which public policy has two
components, a level of public good provision and an income tax rate, and
we assume for concreteness that the incumbent occupies the traditionally
conservative position of small government (i.e., low income taxes and low
government expenditures). News reporting essentially projects this multi-
dimensional space into a one-dimensional spectrum, and after reading the
news, each citizen makes a voting decision and an economic decision (for
concreteness, a job choice). Information revealed by the media about the
challenger￿ s stance on public good provision is of social value because it al-
lows citizens to vote for the candidate whose policy position is closer to the
optimal provision of public good. Information about the challenger￿ s posi-
tion on tax policy is of private value because it allows citizens to choose jobs
according to their expectations about the tax rate to be implemented by the
new government. Information about the latter issue, however, may have a
negative externality on social welfare: if the citizens expect the challenger to
win the election but implement high income tax rates, then they will choose
lower paying jobs, which hurts everyone in the economy.
3We stipulate that suppression of information does play some role in media slant; see,
e.g., McMillan and Zoido (2004) for a particularly egregious and well-documented case.
2We take the view that citizens are more likely to pay attention to polit-
ical news that a⁄ects their own private decisions; this is just the converse
statement of the ￿rational ignorance hypothesis￿of Downs (1957).4 Thus,
we regard as a desirable feature of our model the fact that the information
transmitted by the media is of use for citizens￿private economic decisions.
It also creates a strategic linkage between the two decisions, as a citizen
must anticipate the outcome of the election in order to make the optimal job
choice. We show, for example, that in equilibrium a citizen will not choose
to take the low-paying job and vote for the incumbent. In short, each citizen
must make her job choice and voting decision jointly and must do so in light
of the joint choices of others.
By considering both political and economic decisions, our model high-
lights three novel aspects of the e⁄ect of media on electoral and economic
outcomes. First, more information provided by the media to voters is not
necessarily good for society. Second, economic and political decisions are
interdependent. Decisions of citizens with respect to which candidate to
support interact with their economic decisions, and their economic decisions
are based in turn on their expectations about which of the candidates will
attract more popular support. Third, and related, the news has predictive
value to citizens, and this value is greater when other citizens access the same
news media. By tapping the same sources of information as others, a citizen
can make more precise inferences about the decisions of others and, thereby,
about aggregate outcomes. In particular, accessing the same media as others
allows a citizen to more accurately predict the result of the election.
We assume for most of the analysis that all media share the same slant,
or equivalently, that there is a single media outlet. We use this model to
investigate the optimal partisan slant, i.e., the choice of slant that maximizes
the probability of either the incumbent or the challenger winning the election.
Our analysis reveals that by judicious choice of slant, the media can have
a substantial impact on the outcome of the election.5 A partisan media
will choose to be more electorally informative if it favors the underdog, the
4Because the e⁄ect of a single vote is negligible, citizens have minimal incentive to
acquire information that is only useful for voting.
5This is interesting in itself as recent behavioral literature (in particular, DeMarzo et
al. 2003 and DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) has cast doubt about the possibility of media
e⁄ects on policy outcomes in a rational expectations setup. Of course, we are introducing
a behavioral style assumption in forcing the media to report one-dimensional news.
3candidate who trails in popular support on the basis of prior beliefs. If that is
the the challenger, then pro-challenger media will be most informative with
respect to the challenger￿ s position on the public good, hoping that the news
will lead to an upset victory by the challenger; pro-incumbent media, instead,
will be most informative with respect to the tax policy of the challenger,
which is irrelevant for citizens as long as the challenger is expected to lose.
Conversely, if the incumbent is the underdog, then a pro-challenger media
will be most informative about the challenger￿ s tax policy, which in￿ uences
job decisions but not voting intentions; pro-incumbent media, instead, will
pick an intermediate slant, hoping that bad news about the challenger will
lead to an upset victory by the incumbent.6
Next, we take a welfare perspective on the media choice of slant. We
show that if citizens are inclined to take higher paying jobs on the basis
of prior beliefs, then they are better o⁄ if the media favors the underdog.
This is because the media will put more emphasis on information regarding
the position of the challenger on the public good, which is socially useful,
rather than information regarding the income tax position of the challenger,
which can only be socially damaging. Conversely, if citizens are inclined to
take lower paying jobs on the basis of prior beliefs, then citizens are (gen-
erally) better o⁄ if the media favors the frontrunner, the candidate leading
in electoral support on the basis of prior beliefs. The reasoning in this case
is more involved. If citizens care little about the public good provision, pro-
incumbent media is better than pro-challenger media because it reduces to
zero the probability that citizens take lower paying jobs. If instead citizens
care a great deal about the public good, then pro-challenger media is better
than pro-incumbent media because it maximizes the probability of the chal-
lenger winning the election and increases the probability that citizens take
higher paying jobs conditional on citizens voting for the challenger.
We then consider the e⁄ects of balanced media, i.e., media that puts the
same emphasis on both policy dimensions.7 We show that balanced media
is always worse than either pro-challenger or pro-incumbent media, and for
6As this last case illustrates, partisan media will not necessarily adopt an extreme slant.
7As Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) advise, ￿Keeping news in proportion and not leaving
important things out are also cornerstones of truthfulness. Journalism is a form of car-
tography: it creates a map for citizens to navigate society. In￿ ating events for sensation,
neglecting others, stereotyping or being disproportionately negative all make a less reliable
map.￿
4some parameter values it is worse than both. A balanced slant is always
intermediate between the slants that would be chosen by pro-challenger and
pro-incumbent media. But social welfare is not necessarily monotonic in
slant. Citizens may be better o⁄ with an extreme slant that guarantees
that either the incumbent will win, thus assuring that citizens will take high
paying jobs, or the challenger will win, thus increasing the probability of
a better public good provision, than with an intermediate slant that does
neither.
Finally, we consider an extension of the model in which citizens may split
in audiences of media outlets with potentially di⁄erent slants. We argue
that, since the private value of information stems from its use in the citizens￿
private economic decisions, there will be a strong tendency for all citizens to
listen to media with similar slants insofar as citizens face similar economic
decisions.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the growing literature on the role of the media. In Section 3, we present the
model with exogenous slant. In Section 4, we de￿ne our equilibrium concept
and state our existence and uniqueness result. In Section 5, we explore the
implications of partisan media for slant. In Section 6, we take up the issue of
the socially optimal slant. In Section 7, we brie￿ y consider the extension of
the model to media outlets with di⁄erent slants. In Section 8, we o⁄er some
concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
Our de￿nition of ￿slant￿is more general than that usually given in the lit-
erature. The term is often explained as the omission of information toward
a particular end. Indeed, Hayakawa (1964) de￿nes the term as ￿the process
of selecting details that are favorable or unfavorable to the subject being
described￿(p.13). Groseclose and Milyo (2005) also de￿ne ￿bias￿as the se-
lective omission of facts.8 We de￿ne ￿slant,￿in contrast, as an orientation
8They write that ￿for every sin of commission, such as those by (Stephen) Glass or
(Jayson) Blair, we believe that there are hundreds, and maybe thousands, of sins of omis-
sion￿(p.1205). Although the authors use the term ￿bias,￿they o⁄er ￿slant￿as an equiv-
alent term.
5that systematically distorts news. The mechanism through which this occurs
may be as simple as the omission of facts, but it can be more subtle and nu-
anced, resulting from of the choice of phrasing, the emphasis of some details
over others, the ordering of facts, etc. In fact, our de￿nition appears to be
consistent with examples used by other authors, which seem to allude to a
more nuanced enterprise. For example, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) of-
fer an illustration of slant by juxtaposing two possible stories about a small
increase in the unemployment rate. The di⁄erence between these two sto-
ries is more than simply a discrepancy between two lists of facts; rather, the
stories di⁄er in wording, emphasis, and framing.9
Our formalization of slant, in so far as it involves the projection of a multi-
dimensional issue space down to a one-dimensional spectrum, is reminiscent
of ideas discussed by Enelow and Hinich (1981) in a model of uncertainty
about candidate positions. They tell a bounded rationality story: ￿In a
world of imperfect information, a world in which there are costs associated
with gathering and evaluating new information, the voter, faced with a seri-
ous decision such as deciding which candidate would make a better president,
is forced to utilize a shortcut method to arrive at his choice.￿(p.489) In fact,
they note that ￿this simpli￿cation process is practiced even by those who
watch campaigns most closely￿ journalists￿ who certainly are much better
informed than most voters about the complexity of candidates￿statements
and actions.￿ (p.489) The idea of a reduction of the policy space is also
considered by Hammond and Humes (1993), following suggestions by Riker
(1990). In contrast to the latter authors, who assume voters are myopic, and
the former authors, who take voter beliefs as exogenous, we present a fully
rational model in which voters understand the process through which news
about economic policy are framed.
The phenomenon of media slant is a topic of growing interest in the
literature. Evidence for the existence of media slant is provided by Groseclose
and Milyo (2005), Puglisi (2006), and Lott and Hassett (2004), and a number
of other papers provide various theoretical explanations for slant. Focusing
on the demand side, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) assume that readers
hold beliefs they like to see con￿rmed. In contrast, Baron (2006) and Bovitz
9One story begins, ￿Recession Fears Grow: New data suggest the economy is slipping
into a recession,￿and the other begins, ￿Turnaround in Sight: Is the economy poised for
an imminent turnaround?￿See Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), pp.1032￿ 1033.
6et al. (2002) focus on the supply side, analyzing the incentives of reporters
and editors to manipulate the news. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) also
focus on the supply side, demonstrating that a media outlet￿ s concern for
reputation can lead to the censoring of unexpected stories. Chan and Suen
(2004) consider a media outlet with policy preferences that can falsify reports
about the true state of the world to achieve preferred outcomes. Bernhardt et
al. (2006) combine both sides of the market, assuming that two media ￿rms
compete for patronage from citizens who have a preference for stories about
their favorite candidate. Besley and Prat (2004) consider the possibility of
government capture of the media.10
In all of the forgoing theoretical models, the nature of the decision facing
media outlets is either to lie by falsely reporting their signal or to simply
suppress their information. Only Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Chan
and Suen (2004) model the media￿ s decision as a continuous variable, allowing
in principle the possibility of capturing the subtleties of slant, but in both of
those papers the media, after observing a signal of a one-dimensional state
variable, simply sends a one-dimensional announcement that has no necessary
connection to the true state. Thus, news stories are not informative, per se,
beyond the strategic inferences drawn by readers. In Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2006) and Baron (2006), the media outlet has a binary choice of stories
and, similarly, makes reports that have no meaning beyond the strategic
information they convey.11 In other papers, news stories do have content
in the sense that reports are veri￿able, and the media outlet can choose
not to report its information.12 In contrast, the media outlet in our model
may choose from a continuum of orientations, and while reporting involves a
simpli￿cation of the facts (and a corresponding loss of information), a story
is a noisy signal with meaningful content.
10Though not explicitly concerned with the media, Virag (2006) and Glaeser, Ponzetto,
and Shapiro (2005) show the possibility of divergence of party platforms when voters
are only informed of the position of their preferred candidate. This assumption can be
rationalized if there are two media outlets, each reports the position of one candidate, and
each voter patronizes only the outlet covering her candidate.
11Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) do assume, however, that readers can con￿rm or dis-
con￿rm a story with some probability. The latter authors suggest that the media outlet in
their model can employ subtler forms of bias by a suitable labelling of news stories. But
that interpretation is limited by the assumption that there are only two possible stories.
12Puglisi (2004) also assumes that all reports are veri￿able, but the media outlet￿ s actions
are determined by spin exerted by an incumbent politician.
7A ￿nal point of di⁄erentiation of the above models is their treatment
of the citizen￿ s decision. In Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Baron (2006),
Stromberg (2004), and Bovitz et al. (2002), the reader is assumed to use
information from the news to make a private decision. Thus, readers will be
willing to pay a positive amount for the news. This is also true in Bernhardt
et al. (2006) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), where readers receive
intrinsic utility from reading the news. In Besley and Prat (2006) and Chan
and Suen (2004), readers use information obtained from the news to make a
voting decision. In our model, each citizen uses information to jointly make
a private decision and cast a vote, but in so doing they use information from
the news to predict the actions of other citizens, a strategic aspect not present
in other models.
3 Exogenous Slant
We consider an election between an incumbent (I) and a challenger (C).
We posit a simple model of the economy, in which public policy has two
components: a level of public good provision, g, and an income tax rate, t.
Thus, the set of policies is the two-dimensional space <+￿[0;1], with typical
element (g;t). Income tax revenue is used to ￿nance the public good, with
any de￿cit (or surplus) being collected (or distributed) by a lump sum tax (or
refund). The incumbent and the challenger are committed to implement some
policies (gI;tI) and (gC;tC), respectively, in case either wins the election.
The incumbent￿ s policy is known to citizens, but the challenger￿ s policy is
not. To ￿x ideas, we assume that the challenger favors more taxation and
a larger level of the public good. Citizens have some prior beliefs about the
challenger￿ s policy, represented by a uniform distribution over [g;g] ￿ [t;t],
with g ￿ gI and t ￿ tI.
There is a unit mass of citizens, who for simplicity are ex ante identical.
Citizens can learn about the challenger￿ s policy by reading a unique media
outlet. The media outlet does not directly report the challenger￿ s policy, but
rather it reports the projection of the challenger￿ s policy on a straight line in
the policy space through the incumbent￿ s policy, (gI;tI), with negative slope.
The slope of this line corresponds to media slant. Thus, we assume that
the process of reporting the challenger￿ s position necessarily involves some
8simpli￿cation, in that the multidimensional policy space is collapsed into a
one-dimensional statistic. That such simpli￿cation indeed takes place is not
controversial, as the complexities of real world policy cannot be precisely
conveyed in a media report. Furthermore, we assume that this simpli￿ca-
tion is systematic, in that it takes the form of a projection. Though we do
not model the mechanism underlying slant explicitly, we view it as arising
from the media outlet￿ s choice of editorial board or the hiring and ￿ring of
journalists. For now, we assume the level of slant is exogenously ￿xed and
known to the citizenry. When we endogenize slant, in Section 5, we assume
that the media￿ s choice of slant is observed by the citizenry prior to economic
and voting decisions. This implicitly assumes that slant can only be adjusted
slowly or at substantial cost, as is consistent with our interpretation.
After reading the news, and before the election, citizens must decide
whether to take a high-paying job or a low-paying job. If the policy (g;t) is
adopted, then the utility of a citizen from taking the high-paying job is
u(g) + (1 ￿ t)w
H + ￿ ￿ e;
and the utility of the citizen from taking the low-paying job is
u(g) + (1 ￿ t)w
L + ￿:
The function u represents the utility citizens derive from the public good,
while the constants wH > 0 and wL > 0 represent the wage earned in the
high-paying and the low-paying job, respectively. The constant e is a ￿xed
cost, e.g., the cost of education, involved in acquiring the skills required for
the high-paying job. We assume 0 < e < wH ￿ wL. The term ￿ represents a
lump-sum transfer to each citizen and is obtained from the policy (g;t) using
the government budget-balance condition:
￿ = ￿c(g) + t(w
HP(H) + w
LP(L)):
The function c represents the per capita cost of providing the public good,
and P(H) and P(L) are the fraction of citizens who take high-paying and
low-paying jobs, respectively. Of course, these fractions are determined en-
dogenously by the behavior of all citizens.
For convenience, we maintain the following parametric assumptions.
(A1) (gI;tI) = (0;0);
9(A2) (g;t) = (0;0) and (g;t) = (1;1);
(A3) u(g) ￿ c(g) = 2bg ￿ 3g2, where 0 < b < 3=2.
Assumption (A1) is tantamount to a normalization, and assumption (A2)
￿xes the idea that the incumbent holds the traditionally conservative posi-
tion of small government. Assumption (A3) provides a convenient functional
form for the net bene￿t of the public good in terms of a parameter b, which
measures the value of the public good. It implies that
R g
g (u(g) ￿ c(g))dg
is strictly concave in g;g. This implies, in turn, that the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium described in Theorem 1 has a simple cuto⁄ structure. It
is straightforward to verify that the optimal level of public good provision is
g￿ = b=3, and that the net bene￿t from g = 2b=3 units of the public good is
equal to zero: beyond that, the per capita cost of the public good outweighs
the per capita bene￿t, and the citizens would on average be better o⁄ with
no public good.
Recall that the media reports the projection of the challenger￿ s policy on
a negatively sloped line in <2 going through the origin (0;0). We denote the
absolute value of the slope of this line by ￿, where ￿ 2 <++ [ f0;1g, and
we refer to it as the slant of the media. For a ￿xed ￿, we refer to the set
of points in the unit square with a common projection on the line as a news
story. Thus, a story is a line segment, denoted s, contained in the unit square.
We write (g(s);t(s)) and (g(s);t(s)), with g(s) ￿ g(s) and t(s) ￿ t(s), to
indicate the lower and upper endpoints, respectively, of the story s. We use
the obvious notation
s = [(g(s);t(s));(g(s);t(s))]
to describe a story by its endpoints. Figure 1 illustrates a story s and its
projection (what we might call the news ￿report￿ ) r(s) on the line y = ￿￿x.
We denote the set of stories given slant ￿ by S￿. For any ￿, the set
of stories S￿ is completely ordered according to the partial order ￿, with
asymmetric part ￿, given by
s
0 ￿ s () t(s) ￿ t(s
0) and g(s) ￿ g(s
0):
That is, s0 ￿ s indicates that the story s0 is located ￿to the southeast￿of
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Figure 1: A News Story s and Corresponding News Report r(s)
story containing the point (1;0). Note that, if ￿ 2 <++, then the stories s
and s reveal the exact location of the challenger￿ s policy.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We ￿rst examine a citizen￿ s optimal job choice. This will depend on the
probabilities that the incumbent and the challenger win the election, P(Ijs)
and P(Cjs), from the point of view of a citizen after reading the news report
r(s). These probabilities are determined by the behavior of all citizens, but
they are taken as given by any individual citizen. The optimal job choice
will also depend on the fractions of citizens who take high-paying and low-
paying jobs, P(Hjs) and P(Ljs), following story s. In a rational expectations
equilibrium, the probabilities P(Ijs) and P(Cjs) and the fractions P(Hjs)
and P(Ljs) will be anticipated correctly by each citizen.
When the incumbent is re-elected, a citizen with the high-paying job
receives the high wage less the necessary investment, wH￿e. In this case, the
level of public good and the income tax are both zero. When the challenger
11is elected, the citizen pays income tax twH, receives utility u(g) ￿ c(g) from










￿ is the expectations operator. (For notational convenience, from now
on we drop the superscript C when referring to the challenger￿ s policy. And
when not central to the discussion, we drop the superscript ￿ on E, leaving
the dependence on slant implicit.) Simplifying the previous expression, we
have
w




Similarly, if a citizen takes a low-paying job, then the citizen￿ s expected
utility is
w









where 4w = wH ￿ wL, and will be willing to a take low-paying job if and
only if the inequality is reversed. Note that 1 ￿ e=￿w > 0 follows from our
parametric assumptions. Thus, if the incumbent wins with probability one
after story s, i.e. P(Cjs) = 0, then every citizen prefers the high-paying job.
After making their job choices, citizens decide which party to support in
the election. Citizens vote sincerely. Since a citizen with a high-paying job
receives utility (1￿t)wH￿e regardless of which candidate wins, the inequality
characterizing when the citizen is willing to support the incumbent reduces
to
tw




E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] ￿ 4wP(Ljs)E[tjs] ￿ 0:
12The citizen will be willing to support the challenger when the inequality is
reversed. Similarly, a citizen who has taken a low-paying job is willing to
support the incumbent if and only if
tw




E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] + 4w(1 ￿ P(Ljs))E[tjs] ￿ 0:
Note that the incentive to support the incumbent is larger for a citizen with
a high-paying job than for a citizen with a low-paying job, but even citizens
with high-paying jobs may support the challenger.
Given slant ￿ and any story s 2 S￿, we say that the pair P(Cjs);P(Ljs) 2
[0;1]2 is a rational expectations outcome at s if the actions of individual
citizens induced by P(Cjs), P(Ljs), E[u(g)￿c(g)js], and E[tjs] are consistent
with their beliefs about P(Cjs) and P(Ljs). We will show that, generically,
there are only three possible types of rational expectations outcomes. We
consider these in turn.
Type 1. Suppose the challenger wins the election and all citizens take
a low-paying job, i.e., P(Cjs) = 1 and P(Ljs) = 1. Given the preceding
analysis, this is a rational expectations outcome if and only if
(1) E[tjs] ￿ 1 ￿
e
4w
and E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] ￿ 0:
Type 2. Similarly, P(Cjs) = 1 and P(Ljs) = 0 is a rational expectations
outcome if and only if
(2) E[tjs] ￿ 1 ￿
e
4w
and E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] ￿ 0:
Type 3. Suppose P(Cjs) = 0 and P(Ljs) = 0. Recall that when the
incumbent wins with probability one, all citizens prefer the high-paying job,
so this is a rational expectations outcome if and only if
(3) E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] ￿ 0:
Other rational expectations outcomes are conceivable, but they rely on
razor￿ s edge conditions on the parameters of our model. Because such equi-
libria are not robust, we preclude them with the following maintained as-
sumption. With it, rational expectations outcomes other than Types 1￿ 3
13can occur only after a negligible (i.e., measure zero) set of stories, and they
are therefore inconsequential to our analysis.
(A4) e=4w = 2 f1=2;3=4g and b 6= 1.
Given slant ￿, a rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions
P(Cj￿): S￿ ! [0;1] and P(Lj￿): S￿ ! [0;1] such that P(Cjs);P(Ljs) is a
rational expectations outcome for almost every story s 2 S￿. In the interest
of parsimony, we will not distinguish between equilibria that di⁄er only on
a set of measure zero stories. The next theorem (proved in the Appendix)
establishes the existence and uniqueness of a rational expectations equilib-
rium.
Theorem 1 For any given ￿, there is a unique rational expectations equi-





0 if s ￿ s￿
C
1 if s￿
C ￿ s and P(Ljs) =
￿
0 if s ￿ s￿
C or s ￿ s￿
L
1 if s￿
C ￿ s and s￿
L ￿ s .
Moreover, for ￿ 2 <++, the stories s￿
C and s￿
L solve





The equilibrium has a simple ￿cuto⁄￿structure, given by the two stories
s￿
C and s￿
L. If a story s is realized to the southeast of s￿
C, i.e., s ￿ s￿
C, then
citizens learn that the challenger intends to implement an excessively high
level of the public good. That is, E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] < 0, so that only Type 3
rational expectations outcomes are possible: citizens decide to vote in favor
of the incumbent, and since the incumbent will not impose income taxes,
citizens all take the high-paying job. In the remaining case of s￿
C ￿ s, we
may have stories realized to the southeast of s￿
L, i.e., s￿
C ￿ s ￿ s￿
L.13 Then
citizens learn that the challenger intends to implement a level of the public
good that they like more than the status quo, and citizens anticipate that
the income tax implemented by the challenger will be moderate. That is,
E[tjs] < 1 ￿ e=￿w, so that only Type 2 outcomes are possible: citizens all
















Figure 2: Cuto⁄ News s￿
L and s￿
C
vote for the challenger and take high-paying jobs. Finally, after news located
to the northwest of both s￿
C and s￿
L, citizens learn that the challenger intends
to implement a level of the public good that they like, but they also learn
that the challenger intends to ￿nance the provision of the public good with
high labor taxes. That is, E[tjs] > 1 ￿ e=￿w, so that only Type 1 outcomes
are possible: citizens all vote for the challenger and take low-paying jobs.
The structure of equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.
The exact form of the equilibrium found in Theorem 1 depends on the
solutions to the two equations




and these solutions in turn depend on parameter values. The solution to the
￿rst equation depends on whether b < 1 or b > 1. That is, it depends on the
value of the public good. It is straightforward but cumbersome to derive the
closed form of s￿
C in these two cases.



























if b ￿ ￿ < 1
[(0;1);(1;1)] if ￿ = 1
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if b ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1
[(0;0);(1;0)] if ￿ = 1
;
where the value of b ￿ is given by the expression
b ￿ =
3 ￿ b ￿
p
b2 + 2b ￿ 3
2
:
This is the level of slant such that the cuto⁄ s￿
C includes the point (1;1),
i.e., it is the maximum level of slant such that citizens, after a report on a
challenger with position (g;t) = (1;1), expect nonpositive utility from the
challenger￿ s public good level.
The solution to the second equation depends on the returns to the high-
paying job relative to the cost of human capital investment.
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if (2 ￿ 2e
4w)￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
16Theorem 1 describes the equilibrium outcome after almost every story for
every slant. With the closed form calculated above, we can make positive
predictions about the slant for di⁄erent objective functions of the media
outlet as well as welfare comparisons. We take up these issues in the following
sections.
5 Partisan Media
In this section, we derive the optimal slant under the assumptions that the
media outlet seeks to maximize the probability that one candidate or the
other wins the election. We assume that the choice of slant takes place and
is publicly observed prior to the citizens￿job choices and votes. Thus, we
take a long run view of slant as a variable that can only be adjusted slowly
or at substantial cost. It would be implausible, for example, for a media
outlet to replace its editorial board and alter its orientation to manipulate
the beliefs of citizens immediately prior to an election.
5.1 Pro-Incumbent Media
Assume the media is biased in favor of the incumbent, in the sense that
it chooses slant with the objective of maximizing the probability of the in-
cumbent winning the election. The following result states that the optimal
slant depends on the value of the public good, given by b. If the electorate
favors the incumbent ex ante, i.e., b < 1, then citizens care little about
the public good that the challenger will deliver, and the optimal choice for
pro-incumbent media is to conceal all information about public good policy.
Absent any information about the challenger￿ s position, voters will be turned
away by the expectation that the challenger will overprovide public good, and
the incumbent wins the election with probability one. If the electorate favors
the challenger ex ante, i.e., b > 1, then the value of the public good is high,
and the best a pro-incumbent media can do is choose an interior slant that
reveals information about the intended level of the public good in proportion
to the payo⁄ that voters receive from the it, hoping that this level will be
high enough to discourage voters. Then the incumbent wins the election with
probability decreasing in b and going from 1=2 when b is close to one to 0
17when b is close to 3=2.14
Proposition 1 The probability that the incumbent wins is uniquely maxi-
mized at ￿ = 1 if b < 1 and at ￿ = ^ ￿ if b > 1. If the media is biased in
favor of the incumbent, then the incumbent wins with probability one if b < 1
and with probability 1 ￿ b=3 ￿ (1=6)
p
4b2 ￿ 3b ￿
2 if b > 1.
Proof. Suppose 0 < b < 1. Using the ￿rst line of Theorem 1(iii), if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
b, then the probability of the incumbent winning the election is the area of
the trapezoid to the right of s￿
C. This area is 1￿b=3￿(1=6)
p
4b2 ￿ 3￿2, which
is increasing in ￿. Using the second line of Theorem 1(iii), if b ￿ ￿ < 1,
then the probability of the incumbent winning is one minus the triangle to
the left of s￿
C. This area is 1 ￿ b2=(2￿) and is increasing in ￿. Using the
third line of Theorem 1(iii), if ￿ = 1, then the probability of the incumbent
winning is 1. Thus, if 0 < b < 1, then the probability of the incumbent
winning the election is maximized at ￿ = 1.
Suppose 1 < b < 3=2. Using the ￿rst line of Theorem 1(iv), if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿,
then the probability of the incumbent winning the election is the area of the
trapezoid to the right of s￿
C. This area is 1 ￿ b=3 ￿ (1=6)
p
4b2 ￿ 3￿2, which
is increasing in ￿ and achieves a maximum of
1￿b=3￿(1=6)
p

















b2 + 2b ￿ 3
at ￿ = b ￿. Using the second line of Theorem 1(iv), if ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1, then the
probability of the incumbent winning the election is the area of the triangle
to the right of s￿
C, which is strictly decreasing in ￿. Using the third line of
Theorem 1(iii), if ￿ = 1, then the probability of the incumbent winning is
0. Thus, if 1 < b < 3=2, then the probability of the incumbent winning the
election is maximized at ￿ = ^ ￿.
5.2 Pro-Challenger Media
Assume that the media outlet is biased in favor of the challenger, in the
sense that it chooses slant with the objective of maximizing the probability
14Recall for the statement of Proposition 1 that b ￿ is the maximum level of slant such
that citizens, after a report on a challenger with position (g;t) = (1;1), expect nonpositive
utility from the challenger￿ s public good level.
18of the challenger winning the election. An argument similar to the proof
of the previous proposition establishes that if the challenger is the ex ante
frontrunner, b > 1, then the optimal slant of pro-challenger media is to
suppress the candidate￿ s position on the public good and report only the
candidate￿ s tax policy. Then the challenger provides a more e¢ cient level of
public good, in expectation, and citizens vote for the challenger, who wins
with probability one. If the challenger is the ex ante underdog, b < 1, then
the optimal slant is to perfectly reveal the challenger￿ s position on the public
good in the hope that the revealed policy position will be low enough to
attract voters. In this case, the challenger wins the election with probability
increasing in b and going from zero when b is close to zero to 2=3 when b is
close to one.
Proposition 2 The probability that the challenger wins is uniquely maxi-
mized at ￿ = 0 if b < 1 and at ￿ = 1 if b > 1. If the media is biased in favor
of the challenger, then the challenger wins with probability 2b=3 if b < 1 and
with probability one if b > 1.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 show that when the media is biased
toward the frontrunner (the incumbent when b < 1, the challenger when
b > 1), its optimal slant conceals information about the challenger￿ s position
on public policy. This suppresses socially valuable information and leads to
the possibility of an ine¢ cient choice of public good level by the electorate,
but the media￿ s preferred candidate wins with probability one. When biased
toward the challenger, the media￿ s optimal slant reveals information about
the challenger￿ s position on public good and yields the outcome preferred by
the media with positive probability.
Figure 3 contrasts the probability of the challenger winning the election
with a pro-challenger media and with a pro-incumbent media for di⁄erent
values of b. The signi￿cant gap between the two probabilities is an indication
of the power of the media to in￿ uence the result of the election. For purposes
of comparison, the dashed line represents the probability that the challenger
wins the election when the media is balanced in the sense of adopting a slant
equal to 1, which implies covering both dimensions of the policy space with
the same weight.










Figure 3: Probability of Challenger Winning the Election: Pro-Challenger
(thin line), Pro-Incumbent (thick line) and Balanced Media (dashed line)
6 Welfare
In this section, we compare pro-incumbent, pro-challenger, and balanced me-
dia from the point of view of social welfare. To obtain a benchmark, we ￿rst
characterize the socially optimal level of slant. To simplify the presentation,
in the remainder of the section we impose the following assumption:
(A5) 4w ￿ e ￿ 7=18 and (e=￿w)2(￿w ￿ e) ￿ 1=24.
That is, we assume that the net gain (before taxes) for the high-paying
job and the relative cost of education are not too small.15
Note that from the viewpoint of social welfare, income tax in itself is ir-
relevant to the extent that tax proceeds are returned to citizens as lump-sum
transfers. Of course, if citizens anticipate a high income tax, then they will
take low paying jobs, which reduces social welfare. Also, from the viewpoint
15As it is clear from the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, assumption (A5) is not needed
for most of our results.
20of social welfare, the public good level g that the challenger intends to im-
plement is better than the status quo if and only if u(g) ￿ c(g) > 0, i.e., if
and only if 0 < g < 2b=3. Thus, social welfare is maximized when citizens
take high paying jobs regardless of who wins the election and the challenger
wins the election if and only if 0 < g < 2b=3. For any given slant ￿, social
losses with respect to this maximum can be measured as









(c(g) ￿ u(g))dg dt;
where I(￿) is the area in the unit square where the incumbent wins the
election, and C(￿) is the area where the challenger wins the election.
The ￿rst term in the right-hand side of the above equation is the loss
due to the (ex ante, before learning the news) probability that citizens take
low paying jobs, and it is equal to the area in the unit square such that low
paying jobs are adopted, P(Lj￿), multiplied by the loss ￿w￿e. The second
term is the loss due to failing to adopt the challenger￿ s proposed level of the
public good when in fact this level would be better than the status quo, and
it is equal to the net bene￿t of the public good, integrated over the area in
the unit square such that 0 < g < 2b=3 and the challenger is defeated. The
third term is the loss due to adopting the challenger￿ s proposed level of the
public good when in fact this level is worse than the status quo, and it is
equal to the net loss due to the public good, integrated over the area in the
unit square such that 2b=3 < g < 1 and the challenger wins the election.
Since social losses change continuously with the slant ￿, and the set of
possible slants <++ [ f0;1g is compact, there exists an optimal slant ￿￿
for any given parameter values ￿w, e, and b. Proposition 3 (proved in the
Appendix) provides the optimal slant for di⁄erent parameter values.
Proposition 3 (i) If e=￿w < 1=2, then the unique socially optimal slant
is ￿￿ = 0 for all b. (ii) If e=￿w > 1=2, then there exist b0;b00satisfying
1 < b0 ￿ b00 < 3=2 such that the unique socially optimal slant is ￿￿ = 1 if
b < 1, ￿￿ = b ￿ if 1 < b < b0, ￿￿ = 0 if b0 < b < b00, and ￿￿ = (2 ￿ 2e=￿w)￿1
if b00 < b < 3=2.
21If the cost of education is small compared to the salary premium of high-
paying jobs, then it is socially optimal for the media to report only on the
public good (￿￿ = 0). The reason is that in the absence of information
about income taxes, citizens invest in education. Thus, reporting only about
the public good reduces social losses to zero, since the challenger wins the
election only if she intends to implement a level of public good provision with
positive net bene￿ts for citizens.
If the cost of education is large and citizens do not care much about
the public good, then it is socially optimal for the media to report only on
income taxes (￿￿ = 1) if b is smaller than one and to choose the slant b ￿ if b
is slightly above one. Intuitively, when the cost of education is large, citizens
will not acquire education in case the challenger is elected, so if citizens do
not care much about the public good, then it is socially optimal to maximize
the probability of the incumbent winning the election. Finally, if the cost
of education is large and citizens care a great deal about the public good,
then the optimal slant is either 0 or (2￿2e=￿w)￿1, determined according to
the trade-o⁄ between providing the public good, which requires electing the
challenger, and giving incentives for citizens to take high-paying jobs, which
requires electing the incumbent.
Using the previous results, Proposition 4 (proved in the appendix) pro-
vides a ranking of the di⁄erent media objectives according to the expected
utility of citizens.
Proposition 4 (i) If e=￿w < 1=2, then if b < 1, pro-challenger media is
socially optimal, and pro-incumbent media is better for citizens than balanced
media, and if b > 1, pro-incumbent media is better for citizens than balanced
media, which in turn is better than pro-challenger media. (ii) If e=￿w > 1=2,
then there exist b;b satisfying 1 < b ￿ b < 3=2 such that if 0 < b < b,
then pro-incumbent media is socially optimal and balanced media is better for
citizens than pro-challenger media; and if b < b < 3=2, then pro-challenger
media is better than balanced media which in turn is better than pro-incumbent
media.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate Proposition 4 for the case of a small education
cost (e=￿w < 1=2) and the case of a large education cost (e=￿w > 1=2),
22respectively.16 In each ￿gure, we represent citizens￿expected welfare under
pro-challenger, pro-incumbent and balanced media as a fraction of expected
welfare under the optimal slant.
Consider ￿rst the case of a small education cost. From Proposition 3, in
this case it is socially optimal for the media to report only on the public good.
When citizens care little about the public good (b < 1), this is exactly the
optimal slant for a pro-challenger media, so pro-challenger media is better
for citizens than pro-incumbent media. When citizens care enough about the
public good (b > 1), though, the optimal slant for a pro-challenger media is
to report only on income taxes, so the ordering of pro-challenger and pro-
incumbent media from the viewpoint of social welfare is reversed.
Consider now the case of a large education cost. From Proposition 3,
in this case it is socially optimal for the media to maximize the probability
that the incumbent gets elected when citizens care little about the public
good. In particular, the optimal slant is ￿ = 1 for 0 < b < 1 and ￿ = b ￿ for
1 < b < b0 for some b0 > 1. Thus, pro-incumbent media is socially optimal for
b < b0 for some b0 > 1. Also from Proposition 3, if citizens care enough about
the public good, then the socially optimal slant is equal to (2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1
which gives more weight than b ￿ to information about the public good. Thus,
pro-challenger media is better than pro-incumbent media for b close enough
to 3=2.
Balanced media implies a slant that is intermediate between the slants
favored by pro-incumbent and pro-challenger media in every case depicted in
Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 illustrates nicely that social welfare is not single-
peaked in slant. If the cost of education is small and citizens do not care
much about the public good, pro-incumbent media would report only on
the income tax dimension, therefore guaranteeing that the incumbent would
win the election with probability one and all citizens would choose high-
paying jobs. Pro-challenger media, on the other hand, would report only
on the public good dimension, therefore guaranteeing that all citizens would
choose high-paying jobs and also that the challenger would win the election
if and only if the intended level of provision of the public good were better
than no provision. Balanced media would report on both policy dimensions
with equal weight, provoking the challenger to win in some circumstances
16We adopt the parameter values e=￿w = 1=4 for Figure 4, e=￿w = 2=3 for Figure 5,
and ￿w ￿ e = 1 for both ￿gures.










Figure 4: Welfare under Pro-Challenger (thin line), Pro-Incumbent (thick
line), and Balanced Media (dashed line) for Small Education Cost










Figure 5: Welfare under Pro-Challenger (thin line), Pro-Incumbent (thick
line), and Balanced Media (dashed line) for Large Education Cost
24in which the intended level of provision of the public good were worse than
no provision, and in some circumstances in which the expectation of the
challenger winning would lead citizens to take low-paying jobs. Thus, there
can be no general presumption that balanced media is a ￿good compromise￿
between media with opposite partisan objectives.
7 Multiple Slants
We have assumed so far that all citizens have access to a single news source,
or alternatively to di⁄erent media sharing the same slant, perhaps because
a similar slant allows media outlets to maximize advertisement revenues,
as proposed by Hamilton (2004) to explain nonpartisan reporting on U.S.
politics from the 1870s to the early 1990s.
Of course, if citizens have access to at least two media with di⁄erent
slants, they can pinpoint exactly the policy position of the challenger. This
would not necessarily be better for citizens than having access to a single
news source. It is simple to check that if citizens can pinpoint exactly the
position of the challenger, they will vote for the challenger and choose high-
paying jobs if t < 1 ￿ e=￿w and g < 2b=3, will vote for the challenger
and choose low-paying jobs if t > 1 ￿ e=￿w, ￿w ￿ e < b2=3 and g 2
(b=3 ￿
p
b2=9 ￿ (￿w ￿ e)=3;b=3 +
p
b2=9 ￿ (￿w ￿ e)=3), and will vote for
the incumbent and choose high-paying jobs in the complement of the closure
of the set just described. Thus, social losses as de￿ned in the previous section
will be positive, since citizens do not always vote for the challenger when
g < 2b=3 and may take low-paying jobs with positive probability. Recall
that social losses are zero with a single news source under the optimal slant
if e=￿w < 1=2.
A more interesting, and possibly more realistic, view is that due to in-
formation processing costs, it is di¢ cult for most or all citizens to read and
understand news reports with di⁄erent slants. In our set up, we can incor-
porate this by assuming that each citizen consults only one news source, and
we can consider the possibility that the citizenry splits into two audiences
for media outlets with di⁄erent slants. We then need to model not only the
job and voting decisions of individuals after reading the news, but also the
ex ante choice of media outlets. Since each vote is negligible, citizens will
25choose the outlet that leads to a better job decision. But since reading the
newspaper that is read by the majority allows a voter to infer which party is
going to win the election, there are potentially multiple equilibria.
To ￿x ideas, suppose that there are two newspapers, 1 and 2, with ex-
ogenously given slants ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1. That is, newspaper 1 informs
only about the public good dimension and newspaper 2 only about the tax
policy dimension. Citizens must decide whether to read one newspaper or
the other but cannot read both. It is easy to check that there is an equi-
librium in which every citizen reads newspaper 2. However, there is also an
equilibrium in which every citizen reads newspaper 1 if and only if either
e=￿w ￿ 1 ￿ 2b=3 or e=￿w > 1=2. If e=￿w ￿ 1 ￿ 2b=3, then a would-be
reader of newspaper 2 would ￿nd it optimal to take a high-paying even if he
knew the income tax rate intended by the challenger is equal to 1, so the
would-be deviator could not learn anything useful from reading newspaper
2. If instead e=￿w > 1=2 and e=￿w > 1 ￿ 2b=3, then a would-be reader of
newspaper 2 would ￿nd it optimal to take low-paying jobs for high enough
income taxes, but would still be worse o⁄ than a reader of newspaper 1 who
knows if the challenger or the incumbent will win the election and who uses
this information to take a low or a high-paying job.
The example above illustrates both the existence of multiple equilibria
and the possibility that private motivations lead all citizens to access media
with similar slants. Further along this line, it may be interesting to consider
a model with di⁄erent media outlets and a heterogeneous citizenry. We leave
this for future research.
8 Final Remarks
We have shown that the media choice of slant, or relative emphasis on the
di⁄erent issues of political interest, may have a large impact on political
outcomes in a rational expectations model of political and economic choice.
In a two-candidate election, if the media is biased in favor of the underdog
(in terms of popular support before listening to the news), then its news
reports will have a potentially large electoral impact, being more informative
about the public good issue, in hopes of an upset victory for the underdog.
In contrast, if the media is biased in favor of the frontrunner, then its reports
26will have little electoral impact. Which of the two biases is better for voters
depends on the importance of choosing the ￿right￿ candidate (promoting
the more e¢ cient public good level) for citizens versus the impact of political
news on the private economic decisions of voters. If political news is expected
to have little impact on private economic decisions, then it is unambiguously
better for voters that media favors the underdog. But if political news have a
large impact on private economic decisions, then it may be better for voters
that media favors the frontrunner.
We have provided what we consider a useful perspective on media slant,
and have used a simple two-dimensional policy model to illustrate the role
of the media from this perspective. Our results related to the optimal choice
of media slant by partisan media are likely to hold under more general con-
ditions than the model we propose; whichever candidate is ahead in popular
support will be less keen on news reports having a large impact on beliefs of
citizens that may induce changes in voting behavior. On the other hand, our
result that citizens may be better o⁄ if the media favors the candidate who
is ahead in popular support depends on the feature of the model that pri-
vate economic decisions in response to more information may make everyone
worse o⁄. The more general point here is that we cannot evaluate the welfare
impact of di⁄erent slants focusing on political outcomes alone, in isolation of
the economic impact of political news.
Our analysis, in contrast to the growing literature on media in￿ uence, has
placed its focus on the role of information in making economic choices (in
addition to voting decisions), the media￿ s choice of perspective (rather than
simply the suppression of information), and the rational use of information
by citizens in forming expectations about the future on the basis of news
reports. Whereas we have largely considered the case of a unitary media
in order to isolate the incentives underlying the media￿ s choice of slant and
to investigate the welfare properties of this choice, more must be done to
improve our understanding of the strategic aspects of media competition and,
related, the role of voter heterogeneity in determining political and economic
outcomes. We leave the treatment of these issues for future work.
27Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: There are three additional types of rational expec-
tation outcome that are not accounted for in Section 4.
Type 4. Suppose P(Cjs) = 1 and 0 < P(Ljs) < 1. A necessary condition
for this to be a rational expectations outcome is that citizens are indi⁄erent
between taking high-paying or low-paying jobs. That is,
E[tjs] = 1 ￿ e=4w:
Type 5. Suppose 0 < P(Cjs) < 1 and either P(Ljs) = 1 or P(Hjs) = 1.
In either case, a necessary condition for this to be a rational expectations
outcome is that citizens are indi⁄erent between supporting the challenger
and the incumbent. That is,
E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] = 0:
Type 6. Suppose 0 < P(Cjs) < 1 and 0 < P(Ljs) < 1. We assume
that citizens choose their actions independently.17 The only value of P(Cjs)
that can be induced by independent actions on the part of citizens is the one
corresponding to an electoral tie, i.e., P(Cjs) = 1=2. Using 0 < P(Ljs) < 1,
we ￿nd that a necessary condition for this to be a rational expectations
outcome is
E[tjs] = 2(1 ￿ e=4w):
It is simple to check that there are no other possible rational expectations
outcomes. If citizens expect P(Cjs) = 0, for example, then all citizens take
the high-paying job, so there is no story such that P(Cjs) = 0 and P(Ljs) > 0
is a rational expectations outcome.
Note that
E[tjs] = (t(s) + t(s))=2:
17Since in our setup there is a continuum of citizens, there is a technical di¢ culty de￿ning
￿independent￿actions whenever a positive measure of citizens adopt mixed strategies. The
independence notion we require is that there is no subset of citizens with positive measure
who cast correlated votes. The idea is that if the probability of the challenger winning the
election is strictly between zero and one and di⁄erent from 1=2, then it is necessarily the
case that a set of citizens with positive measure cast correlated votes.
28It is easy to check that s0 ￿ s implies E[tjs] ￿ E[tjs0], with strict inequality
unless t(s) = t(s0) = 0 and t(s) = t(s0) = 1. Equivalently, s0 ￿ s implies
E[tjs] > E[tjs
0] or E[tjs] = E[tjs
0] = 1=2.
Using assumption (A4) (e=4w 6= 1=2), we ￿nd that the equation E[tjs] =
(1 ￿ e=4w) holds for at most one story s, so Type 4 rational expectations
outcomes can occur only for a measure zero set of stories. Similarly, assump-
tion (A4) (e=￿w 6= 3=4) implies that E[tjs] = 2(1 ￿ e=4w) holds for at most
one s, so Type 6 rational expectations outcomes can occur only for a measure
zero set of stories.
We now argue that E[tjs] = 1￿e=￿w has at most one solution. Suppose
￿ > 0, and note that E[tjs] = 1 and E[tjs] = 0. Using assumption (A4)
(e=4w 6= 1=2), we get that if ￿ > 0, then the equation E[tjs] = 1 ￿ e=4w
has a unique solution s￿
L. Suppose ￿ = 0. If e=4w < 1=2, then we have





For 0 < ￿ ￿ 4w=(2e), it is simple to check that
s
￿
L = [(0;1 ￿ 2e=4w);(2e￿=4w;1)]




L = [(0;1 ￿ e=4w ￿ 1=(2￿));(1;1 ￿ e=4w + 1=(2￿))]
solves E[tjs] = 1 ￿ e=4w. If e=4w > 1=2, then we have E[tjs] = 1=2 >
1￿e=4w for all s. Thus, P(Ljs) = 1 for all s if E[u(g)￿c(g)js] > 0, which




For 0 < ￿ ￿ 1=(2 ￿ 2e
4w), it is simple to check that
s
￿
L = [(1 ￿ 2￿ + 2e￿=4w;0);(1;2 ￿ 2e=4w)]
solves E[tjs] = 1 ￿ e=4w. The remaining case is similar to the argument
given above.
29Now we turn to the expression E[u(g)￿c(g)js]. Note that u(g)￿c(g) > 0
if and only if 0 < g < 2b, and u(g) ￿ c(g) < 0 if and only if 2b < g ￿ 1.
Suppose ￿ 2 <++. Then









= b(g(s) + g(s)) ￿ (g(s)
2 + g(s)g(s) + g(s)
2);
which is strictly concave as a function of g and g. Moreover, g(s) and g(s)
are weakly increasing in s, with at least one of them increasing strictly as we
consider news stories to the southeast, except possibly if g(s) = 0 and g(s) =
1. Note also that E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] is positive for news stories close enough
to s and is negative for news stories close enough to s. By assumption (A4)
(b 6= 1=3), it follows that if g(s) = 0 and g(s) = 1, then E[u(g)￿c(g)js] 6= 0.
Thus, there is at most one solution, which we denote s￿
C, to E[u(g)￿c(g)js] =
0. Moreover,
E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] ? 0 () s 7 s
￿
C
for every story s.
Suppose ￿ = 0, so news stories are fully revealing about g. Thus, E[u(g)￿
c(g)js] > 0 if and only if s0




Suppose ￿ = 1, so that no information about g is revealed by any story.
Then
E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] =
1 Z
0
(u(g) ￿ c(g)) dg = b ￿ 1:










Note the implication that Type 5 rational expectations outcomes can occur
only for a measure zero set of stories.
30From the analysis of Section 4, it follows that if P(Cj￿);P(Lj￿) is a rational
expectations equilibrium of Type 1, 2, or 3, then
P(Cjs) =
￿
0 if E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] < 0




0 if E[tjs] < 1 ￿ e=4w or E(u(g) ￿ c(g)js) < 0
1 if E[tjs] > 1 ￿ e=4w and E[u(g) ￿ c(g)js] > 0
for almost every s 2 S￿. With the foregoing analysis, the existence and
uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium follows, as well as its charac-
terization in terms of the cuto⁄ stories s￿
C and s￿
L.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose e=￿w < 1=2, as in case (iii) following
Theorem 1. In this case, citizens are predisposed to taking high-paying jobs
regardless of who wins the election, in the absence of information about the
income tax level intended by the challenger. By setting ￿ = 0, news are
unrevealing about the income tax level, so that every citizen takes a high-
paying job. Moreover, news are perfectly revealing about the level of the
public good that the challenger intends to implement, so that citizens vote
for the challenger if and only if the net bene￿t of the public good is positive.
Thus, if e=4w < 1=2, then social welfare is maximized by setting ￿ = 0. In
fact, it is uniquely maximized at that slant since for any other slant the sum
of the second and third terms of the social losses equation is positive. This
￿nishes the proof of part (i) of the proposition.
Now suppose e=￿w > 1=2 and b < 1. Using cases (i) and (iv) following
Theorem 1 we get that if b < 1 then s￿
L ￿ s￿
C for all ￿. Thus, citizens take
low-paying jobs whenever they anticipate the challenger will win the election.
Consider any slant ￿ in [0;b]. The expected welfare is
W(￿) = (4w ￿ e)
￿














31W(￿) = (4w ￿ e)
￿




















It is straightforward to check that b < 1 implies W 0(￿) > 0. Thus, no slant
in [0;b) can be optimal.
Now consider any slant ￿ in [b;1]. The expected welfare is




















Thus, W 0(￿) R 0 i⁄
p
6(4w ￿ e) R b. Since 4w￿e ￿ 1=6 (from assumption
A5), it follows that if e=￿w > 1=2 and b < 1 then the optimal slant is 1.
Finally, suppose e=￿w > 1=2 and b > 1. Consider ￿rst any slant ￿ 2
[0;b ￿]. Using cases (ii) and (iv) following Theorem 1 we get that s￿
L ￿ s￿
C.
De￿ning B = b=3 +
p
b2=9 ￿ ￿2=12, the expected welfare is

















It follows that W(￿) is convex. Thus, W(￿) is maximized in the interval
[0;b ￿] by ￿ equal to either 0 or b ￿. Note in particular
W(0) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ 2b=3) + 4b
3=27:
32Now consider any slant ￿ 2 [b ￿;b ￿(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1]. Using cases (ii) and
(iv) following Theorem 1 we get that s￿
L ￿ s￿
C. The expected welfare is
















W(￿) = (4w ￿ e)b ￿
2=2￿ + b ￿ 1 ￿ [(b ￿ 3=2)b ￿
2 + (1 ￿ b=3)b ￿
3 ￿ b ￿
4=4]=￿:
Since the expression in brackets is negative for any b 2 (1;3=2), we have
that W(￿) is strictly decreasing. Thus, W(￿) is maximized in the interval
[b ￿;b ￿(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1] by ￿ equal to b ￿. Note in particular
W(b ￿) = (4w ￿ e)b ￿=2 + b ￿ 1 ￿ [(b ￿ 3=2)b ￿ + (1 ￿ b=3)b ￿
2 ￿ b ￿
3=4]:
Next consider any slant ￿ 2 [b ￿(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1;(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1]. Using









Thus, W(￿) is increasing if
(4w ￿ e)(2 ￿ 2e=4w)
2=2 > ￿[(b ￿ 3=2)b ￿
2 + (1 ￿ b=3)b ￿
3 ￿ b ￿
4=4]=￿
2;
which is satis￿ed for any slant in ￿ 2 [b ￿(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1;(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1] if
(4w ￿ e)=2 > ￿[(b ￿ 3=2) + (1 ￿ b=3)b ￿ ￿ b ￿
2=4]
or equivalently
4w ￿ e > ￿b=2 + 3=4 ￿ b
2=12 ￿ (b=12 ￿ 1=4)
p
b2 + 2b ￿ 3:
The right-hand side in the inequality above is strictly decreasing in b, so
that a su¢ cient condition for W(￿) to be increasing for any b 2 (1;3=2)
is 4w ￿ e ￿ 1=6. Thus, from assumption (A5), W(￿) is maximized by
￿ = (2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1 in the interval [b ￿(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1;(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1].
33Finally consider any slant ￿ 2 [(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1;1]. Using cases (ii) and
(iv) following Theorem 1 we get that s￿
C ￿ s￿
L. The expected welfare is




Since the expression in brackets is negative, W(￿) is strictly decreasing.
Thus, W(￿) is maximized in the interval [(2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1;1] by ￿ equal
to (2 ￿ 2e=4w)￿1. Note in particular
W((2 ￿ 2e=4w)
￿1) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ e=4w) + b ￿ 1
￿[(b ￿ 3=2)b ￿
2 + (1 ￿ b=3)b ￿
3 ￿ b ￿
4=4](2 ￿ 2e=4w):
From the previous paragraphs it follows that if e=￿w > 1=2 and b > 1,
then W(￿) is maximized by setting ￿ equal to either 0, b ￿ or (2￿2e=4w)￿1.
We claim that if b is close to 1 then W(b ￿) is larger than W(0) and W((2 ￿
2e=4w)￿1). To see this, note that b ￿ changes continuously with b and if b is
close to one, then b ￿ is close to one. Thus, for b close to one, W(0) is close to
(4w￿e)=3+4=27, W(b ￿) is close to (4w￿e)=2+1=12, and W((2￿2e=4w)￿1)
is close to (4w ￿ e + 1=6)(1 ￿ e=4w). The desired result follows from
assumption (A5). Next, we claim that if b is close to 3=2 then W((2 ￿
2e=4w)￿1) is larger than W(0) and W(b ￿). To see this, note that if b is close to
3=2, then W((2￿2e=4w)￿1) is close to (4w￿e)(1￿e=4w)+1=2 while W(0)
and W(b ￿) are close to 1=2. Finally, it is tedious but straightforward to verify
that W(0)￿W(b ￿), W((2￿2e=4w)￿1)￿W(b ￿) and W((2￿2e=4w)￿1)￿W(0)
are increasing in b for 1 < b < 3=2 under assumption (A5). Thus, the cuto⁄
points b0;b00 in the statement of the proposition are well-de￿ned. This ￿nishes
the proof of part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose ￿rst e=￿w < 1=2 and b < 1. From
Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 2 it follows that pro-challenger media is
optimal. From Proposition 1 and cases (i) and (iii) after Theorem 1, it
follows that welfare under pro-incumbent media is given by W(1) = 4w￿e.
With respect to balanced media, we have that if b ￿ 2e=4w then W(1) =
(4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ b2=2) + b4=12, and if b ￿ 2e=4w then W(1) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿
2(e=4w)2) + b4=12. Thus, W(1) > W(1) if b ￿ 2e=4w and 4w ￿ e ￿ 1=6
or if b ￿ 2e=4w and (e=￿w)2(￿w ￿ e) ￿ 1=24. Using Assumption (A5) we
obtain W(1) > W(1). This partially proves part (i) of the proposition.
Next suppose e=￿w < 1=2 and b > 1. From Proposition 1 and cases (ii)
and (iii) after Theorem 1, it follows that welfare under pro-incumbent media
34is





Similarly, from Proposition 2, it follows that welfare under pro-challenger
media is
W(1) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ e=4w) + b ￿ 1:






Since the expression in brackets is negative, b ￿ is smaller than one and
e=4w < 1=2, we get W(b ￿) > W(1) > W(1). This ￿nishes the proof of
part (i) of the proposition.
Next suppose e=￿w > 1=2 and b < 1. From Proposition 3(ii) and Propo-
sition 1 it follows that pro-incumbent media is optimal. From Proposition
2 and cases (i) and (iv) after Theorem 1, it follows that welfare under pro-
challenger media is
W(0) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ 2b=3) + 4b
3=27:
Similarly, welfare under balanced media is
W(1) = (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ b
2=2) + b
4=12:
Thus, W(1) > W(0) if 4w ￿ e > b2(4=27 ￿ b=12)=(2=3 ￿ b=2). Since the
expression in the right-hand side of this inequality is increasing in b, it follows
that W(1) > W(0) if 4w ￿ e ￿ 7=18. This partially proves part (ii) of the
proposition.
Last, suppose e=￿w > 1=2 and b > 1. From Proposition 3(ii) and Propo-
sition 1 it follows that there is some e b 2 (1;3=2) such that if 1 < b < e b
then pro-incumbent media is optimal. We claim that for b close enough to
1, balanced media is better for citizens than pro-challenger media. To see
this, from Proposition 2, welfare under pro-challenger media is W(1), which
is close to (4w ￿ e)(1 ￿ e=4w) for b close to 1. Similarly, since b ￿ is close
to 1 when b is close to 1, welfare under balanced media (W(1)) is close to
(4w ￿ e)=2 + 1=12 for b close to 1. The desired result follows.
35Finally, we claim that for b close enough to 3=2, pro-challenger media
is better for citizens than balanced media which in turn is better than pro-
incumbent media. Note that b ￿ is close to 0 when b is close to 3=2. Thus,
for b close to 3=2, welfare under pro-challenger media is close to (4w ￿
e)(1 ￿ e=4w) + 1=2, welfare under balanced media is close to (4w ￿ e)(2 ￿
2e=4w)2=2 + 1=2 and welfare under pro-incumbent media is close to 1=2.
The desired result follows. This and the previous claim ￿nish the proof of
part (ii) of the proposition.
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